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The State of Arbitral Fees After
Green Tree Financial: Uncertainty And
Contradiction Demands Further Guidance
From The Supreme Court
Kevin C. Clark'
There are millions of employees in America who work every day
without regard to the technical and seemingly mundane matters that gov-
ern their employment. What they don't realize however, is that their em-
ployment may be governed by an arbitration agreement. After the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Circuit City Stores v. Adams2, arbitration
agreements are permissible in most employer/employee relationships and
fall under the purview of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The terms of
the arbitration agreement, though, may be unclear until a dispute arises.'
During the resolution of any dispute, the terms of the arbitration agree-
ment may be unclear even to the attorneys on each side of the dispute.
This is particularly applicable in the area of arbitral fees, where the Su-
preme Court's decision in Adams has provided little guidance to lower
courts enforcing arbitration agreements and the attorneys construing them.
This has led to a split among United States Courts of Appeals when ad-
dressing the issue of who should pay the fees arising from the arbitration
of employment disputes. This fissure in American jurisprudence is the
subject of this study.
The form of this study will flow through several different parts. After
some preliminary information concerning the FAA, the first section will
focus on decisions in the pre-Green Tree Financial era. These decisions,
including the seminal Gilmer v. Interstate/Lane Johnson Corporation, re-
flect the Supreme Court's and other courts' pro-arbitration agreement
I. 2002 Juris Doctorate and Masters in Dispute Resolution from Pepperdine University
School of Law. The author is currently an associate at Haney, Woloson & Mullins in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The author would like to thank his wife and parents for their support, love and gui-
dance. The author would also like to thank Pepperdine University School of Law Professor
Anthony Miller for his advice and support in preparing this paper.
2. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). The Supreme Court ruled that § 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act was not widely restrictive, but widely permitted arbitration agree-
ments in most employment relationships. Id.
3. Id.
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stance. Also in this era, several United States Courts of Appeals addressed
the imposition of arbitral fees, and their decisions were as diverse as the
different areas of the country covered by their respective jurisdictions.
These decisions set the stage for the Supreme Court to address the issue
in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph. Accordingly, the second section
will break down the Supreme Court's recent decision in Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph. 4Although both principle points from Green Tree will
be discussed, the focus of this paper is part two of the Green Tree deci-
sion. In part two, the Supreme Court attempted to address the issue of ar-
bitration fees, and their rule will be discussed extensively. Next, section
three will present the United States Court of Appeal decisions in the post-
Green Tree era in order to see the rule applied. Several courts attempted
to apply the arbitration fee language from Green Tree, and an examination
of these attempts is helpful in determining the reach of the decision. Fi-
nally, the last section of this paper will address the issues that have arisen
in the post-Green Tree era, demonstrating that the uncertainty of arbitral
fees has left employers, employees, and their prospective counsel in legal
limbo and frequently incapable of utilizing arbitration to effectively settle
employment disputes.
Preliminarily, some background on the FAA is necessary. The FAA
was designed to end judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.' The
FAA manifests a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." ' 6
"[T]he basic purpose of the [FAA was] to overcome courts' refusal to en-
force agreements to arbitrate."' 7 The Federal Arbitration Act ensures that
agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 8 Agree-
ments to arbitrate employment disputes are valid and enforceable unless
Congress has specifically precluded arbitration as a dispute resolution de-
vice.9 So long as the employee is able to effectively vindicate his/her stat-
utory rights in arbitration, the forum is an appropriate dispute resolution
device.' 0 Under this system, agreements to arbitrate employment law
claims are regularly enforced.
4. Greentree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
5. Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
6. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. vs. Mercury Const. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
7. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
8. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
9. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-29.
10. Id.
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I. THE PRE-GREEN TREE FINANCIAL Era
In 1991, Robert Gilmer, a registered securities representative em-
ployed by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, brought suit against his
employer alleging violations of the Age Discrimination In Employment
Act." A registration application with the New York Stock Exchange,
signed by Mr. Gilmer, required Gilmer to arbitrate any disputes with his
employer. 2 Gilmer believed he was fired because of his age (sixty-two
years old), and after he brought suit to address the alleged discrimination,
Interstate/Lane Johnson Corporation brought a motion to compel arbitra-
tion.13 The District Court refused to compel arbitration, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered Mr.
Gilmer to arbitrate the dispute because "nothing in the text, legislative
history, or underlying purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) "indicates Congress' intent to preclude the arbitration of age
discrimination disputes."' 4 Mr. Gilmer appealed the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of "whether a claim
under the [ADEA] . . . can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pur-
suant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application."' 5
The Supreme Court emphatically answered the question in favor of
arbitration.
Justice Byron White,' 6 writing for the Court in a 7-2 decision, began
the opinion by explaining the history of the FAA and the strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration agreements. 7 Noting the plethora of Su-
preme Court decisions upholding the validity of arbitration agreements,
11. Id. @23.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. (Citing the 4th Circuit Decision, 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990)).
15. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
16. Justice White passed away during the final stages of this article. At his passing, one is
reminded of his brilliance reflected in Gilmer
17. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-27. It is interesting to note that Section 1 of the FAA was dis-
cussed by Justice White and by Justice Stevens in dissent. Section 1 excludes certain employees
from the FAA, and Justice Stevens argued that by virtue of their exclusion that the FAA did not
apply to Mr. Gilmer. Justice Stevens refused to rule on the scope of Section 1 because Mr. Gil-
mer had not raised the issue below. Approximately ten years later, the Court dealt with the scope
of Section 1 in Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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Justice White restated that the FAA "manifest[s] a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements."" Further, statutory claims arising under
the Sherman Act, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Securities Act of 1933,
were sent to arbitration under the FAA.' 9 Finally, Justice White noted that
parties should be held to their agreements to arbitrate disputes, including
disputes arising under a federal statute, unless Congress has specifically
excluded arbitration as a remedy under the federal statute.20
After dismissing Mr. Gilmer's arguments and noting that Congress
has not specifically excluded the arbitration of ADEA disputes, the court
went on to dismiss Mr. Gilmer's generalized attack on arbitration proce-
dures and processes, opining that "[s]uch generalized attacks on arbitra-
tion res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the pro-
tections afforded in substantive law to would be complainants, and as
such, they are far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."'" The end re-
sult of the court's opinion is the oft-cited Gilmer rule: "so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum" and Congress has not specifically in-
tended to preclude the arbitral forum to resolve disputes under the statute,
then agreements to arbitrate disputes are enforceable. 22 Thus, challenges to
arbitration agreements turn on Congress' intent and the effective vindica-
tion of statutory rights in the arbitral forum. The party attacking the arbi-
tration agreement bears the burden in both of these areas. 23
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia entertained a challenge to an arbitration agreement by an em-
ployee bringing a discrimination claim.24 The case involved Clinton Cole,
a security guard at Union Station in Washington D.C. Mr. Cole was re-
quired to sign a pre-dispute resolution agreement when Burns Interna-
tional Security Services took over the security contract Mr. Cole was
18. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
19. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
21. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
22. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-28.
23. See id. at 26 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227
(1987)).
24. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (1997).
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working under.25 After Cole brought suit for discrimination, harassment
and retaliation, the employer moved to compel arbitration as called for in
the pre-employment dispute agreement. 26 The District Court compelled,
and Cole appealed.
Chief Judge Harry Edwards wrote the lengthy and well-reasoned
opinion for the near-unanimous court.27 In its opinion, the court discussed
arbitration in depth and examined the alleged pitfalls and controversies
raised by agreements to arbitrate.28 The issue addressed by the Cole court
particularly germane to the study at hand was the imposition of arbitral
fees. 29 The court noted that arbitration fees range from $500 to $1000 a
day or more, and are in addition to the administrative and attorneys' fee
accumulating from the dispute.30 The court went on to say that "there can
be no doubt that parties appearing in federal court may be required to as-
sume the costs of filing fees and other administrative expenses, so any
reasonable costs of this sort that accompany arbitration are not problem-
atic. '' 31 However, if the fees are exorbitant, the employee may be deterred
from vindicating their rights in the arbitral forum.32 In a case such as
Cole, where the employer had conditioned employment upon the em-
ployee signing the dispute resolution agreement, the court construed this
as a benefit to the employer, and thus ruled that all of the costs and fees
associated with arbitration should be borne solely by the employer.33
After concluding as a bright line rule that employers should bear all
of the arbitral fees, the court entertained arguments that this one-sided
billing practice would harm employees.34 Specifically, the court noted ar-
gument that if the employer always paid the bill, the arbitrator would al-
25. Id. at 1469.
26. Id. at 1470.
27. Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson concurred in part and dissented in part.
28. Cole, 105 E3d at 1483.
29. Id. at 1483-87,
30. Id. at 1484.
31. Id. The Court noted in a footnote that arbitral fees may be waived under the rules of
the provider organization, such as the American Arbitration Association. Id. n.12.
32. Id. The Court cited David W. Ewing, Justice on the Job: Resolving Grievances in the
Nonunion Workplace, Harvard Business School Press 1989, at 291. The Article noted that North-
rop pays all of the costs associated with the arbitration of employee-employer disputes because if
they didn't, their employees would not be able to afford it. Id.
33. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485.
34. Id.
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ways favor the employer.3 5 The court dismissed this argument; "if an ar-
bitrator is likely to lean in favor of any employer - something we have
no reason to suspect - it would be because the employer is a source of
future arbitration business and not because the employer alone pays the
arbitrator. '3 6 Even if certain arbitrators did favor employers, such a prac-
tice would not go unnoticed by the provider organizations' and plaintiffs'
counsel, and the appearance of corruption would eventually lead to the ju-
diciary overturning arbitral awards.37
Finally, the Cole court read the arbitration agreement at issue as am-
biguous on the fee issue. 8 Relying on the Restatement Second of Con-
tracts and other contract interpretation law, the court construed the agree-
ment to mean that the employer would pay all of the costs associated
with arbitration.39 Thus, the court inserted a term consistent with the opin-
ion they had already reached. The court held that an employee may not
be required to pay all or part of the costs and fees of arbitration under an
agreement the employee was required to sign as a condition of
employment.40
In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
had occasion to visit the fee issue in a case challenging the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration.4' The case involved Ellen Sue Paladino and
her employer, Avnet Computer Technologies Inc. (hereinafter "Avnet").
Paladino signed a pre-employment dispute resolution agreement that man-
dated arbitration of all claims related to employment.42 The clause heavily
favored the employer, for it limited employee's potential damage award to
contractual damages only.43 After Paladino was fired, she brought suit
under Title VII and state law claims. Avnet then brought a motion to
35. Id. Commentators have called the one-sided billing a "perversion of the arbitration
process." See Task Force on ADR In Employment, Due Process Protocol, § c (6) (May 9, 1995).
36. Cole, 105 F3d. at 1485 (citing Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?
61 U. Mo. - KAN L. REv. 693, 714 (1993)). The Cole Court notes there is ample evidence to
support the argument that arbitrators favor employers because they know that in doing so they
will increase their chances of getting future business.
37. Cole, 105 F.3d. at 1485.
38. Id. The agreement made no mention of fees, but rather relied on the American Arbitra-
tion Association rules, which do contain fee provisions.
39. Id. at 1485-86.
40. Id.
41. Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech. Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (1lth Cir. 1998).
42. Id. at 1056.
43. Id. Since arbitration is a creature of contract, this agreement limiting damages effec-
tively limited the arbitrator's authority.
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compel arbitration under the FAA.44 The district court denied the motion,
and Avnet appealed to the appellate court for redress. The single issue on
appeal was whether the district court erred in refusing to grant the motion
to compel. 45
The court created two opinions to address the issues in this case.
First, Chief Justice Hatchett's majority opinion construed the contradictory
language in the employer-created arbitration clause as inconsistent with
the vindication of federal statutory rights. This was because the arbitra-
tor's award was limited to contractual damages only while the clause
mandated all disputes to arbitration.46 Thus, the employee had to go to ar-
bitration, but the arbitrator could only award limited damages. This provi-
sion was deemed unlawful, and together with the other "woefully defi-
cient" language, created an arbitral forum in which an employee could
not effectively vindicate their statutory rights. 47 The fee issue was ad-
dressed in Judge Cox's concurring opinion. Noting that arbitration must
"permit relief equivalent to court remedies," Judge Cox pointed out that
under the Avnet clause, the employee is liable for at least half of the arbi-
tration costs and must pay the $2000 filing fee. 48 Citing the Cole court's
decision that fee shifting is prohibited per se, Judge Cox wrote, "we con-
sider cost of this magnitude a legitimate basis for a conclusion that the
clause does not comport with statutory policy."' 49 Although the entire
agreement had already been thrown out at this point (and thus the above
quoted language amounted to dicta) it nonetheless evidenced the Eleventh
Circuit's willingness to invalidate arbitration agreements based upon fee
clauses that are perceived unfavorable to the effective vindication of em-
ployee's statutory rights.
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit entertained the fee question in an appeal
44. Id.
45. Id. The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed de novo. Kidd vs. Equita-
ble Life Assur. Soc' of Am., 32 F.3d 516, 518 (11th Cir. 1994). See also Armijo vs. Prudential
Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995); Lorber Indus. vs. Los Angeles Printworks Corp., 803
F.2d 523, 524 (9th Cir. 1986).
46. Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1057-58.
47. Id. at 1059.
48. Id. at 1062. The filing fee was under the American Arbitration Association Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules.
49. Id.
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from the denial of an employer's motion to compel arbitration.50 The case
involved Matthew Shankle and his former employer, B-G Maintenance
Management, Incorporated of Colorado (hereinafter "B-G"). 15 As a pre-
condition to his employment as a janitor, B-G required Shankle to sign an
arbitration agreement that mandated all claims, including claims brought
under federal anti-discrimination statutes, to arbitration. 2 The costs of ar-
bitration were assigned equally to the employer and the employee, and if
the employee was unable to pay, the employer would pay on the em-
ployee's behalf and the employee would have to pay the employer back. 3
After Shankle was terminated, he filed a discrimination charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.5 4 While the charge was
pending, the case was referred to an arbitrator pursuant to the arbitration
agreement. 5 The arbitrator accepted the case, then sent a letter to B-G
and Shankle informing them of the anticipated costs of arbitration, and in-
structing each of them to forward the arbitrator a $6000 deposit.5 6 Shankle
objected to the arbitration proceedings, and filed suit in federal court.5 7 B-
G filed a motion to compel, but the district court refused to grant the mo-
tion because the fee splitting provision rendered the arbitral forum an un-
reasonable substitute for the judicial forum, one in which Mr. Shankle
could not effectively vindicate his statutory rights.5 8 B-G appealed.
The unanimous opinion of the court immediately and exclusively ad-
dressed the problems raised by the fee splitting clause.5 9 The court opined,
"[a]s Gilmer emphasized, arbitration of statutory claims works because
potential litigants have an adequate forum in which to resolve their statu-
50. Shankle vs. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
51. Id. at 1231.
52. Id. at 1232.
53. Id.
54. Id. It is interesting to note that Mr. Shankle's case would probably proceed differently
under the Supreme Court's recent decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) in
which the Court preserved the EEOC's powers to proceed with a case despite a valid agreement
to arbitrate between the employer of and employee. In Shankle's case, the arbitration went for-
ward despite the EEOC's investigation. This would probably not be the result today.
55. Shankle, 163 F.3d. at 1232.
56. Id. The arbitration provider was Judicial Arbiter Group, Inc. Id. The arbitrator was
$250 an hour for hearing time, $125 an hour for travel time, and had a $45 dollar an hour sup-
port staff fee. Id.
57. Shankle, 163 F.3d. at 1232. Shankle had initially objected when he was presented the
arbitration agreement, but eventually consented. Id. The Court's opinion seems to suggest that
Mr. Shankle's EEOC charge was dropped after the matter went to arbitration, then he filed an-
other charge, then sued in federal court on the first charge. Id.
58. Shankle, 163 F.3d. at 1232-33.
59. Id. at 1233.
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tory claims and because the broader social purposes behind the statute are
adhered to." 6 The arbitration system envisioned by the Supreme Court,
though, falls apart when the employee cannot effectively vindicate their
rights in the arbitral forum. 61 Noting Cole and Paladino, the court said
that if an arbitration agreement rules out the judicial forum, it must pro-
vide an effective and accessible forum.62 In case before it, Shankle was
contractually obligated to pay between $1,875 and $5,000 to have his
claim settled in arbitration.63 Shankle could not afford this fee, nor could
similarly situated employees, thus "Mr. Shankle [was] between the pro-
verbial rock and a hard place," prohibited from accessing the judicial fo-
rum by his arbitration agreement, and frustrated from using the arbitral
forum because of its high costs.64 Accordingly, the court ruled the agree-
ment to arbitrate was unenforceable because Shankle could not adequately
vindicate his statutory rights.65
In holding that arbitration agreements which require employees to
pay part of the arbitrator's fees in order to hear their statutory claims are
unenforceable, the court dismissed several of the employer's arguments.
First, the employer argued that the agreement allowed the employer to
pay all of the fees upfront, and the arbitrator could deduct any portion of
the fees due from the employee from any potential award.66 The court dis-
missed this argument because the mere possibility of fee shifting does not
lessen the financial burden to the employee; the employee may still be
deterred from accessing the forum because of the prospectively high
fees.67 Secondly, the employer argued that the court should sever or "red-
line" the fee-shifting portion of the arbitration agreement, thus giving ef-
fect to the parties' intent to arbitrate.68 The court rejected this argument
too because the agreement at issue was unambiguously clear on fees, and
a "court is without authority to alter or amend contract terms and provi-
60. Id. at 1234 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24).
61. Shankle, 163 F.3d. at 1234.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1234-35.
65. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28; Cole, 105 F.3d. at 1484-85.)
66. Shankle, 163 F.3d. at 1234 n. 4.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1235 n. 6.
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sions absent an ambiguity."' 69 Finally, the employer argued fee splitting
encourages arbitrators to act in an impartial way.70 The court rejected this
argument also, and relying on Cole, stated that even if fee splitting was
found to promote neutrality among arbitrators, "[the] benefit is substan-
tially outweighed by the impediment such a provision places on access to
the arbitral forum."'" Therefore, pre-employment arbitration agreements,
which require employees to pay part of the arbitration costs, are unen-
forceable in the Tenth Circuit.
As the cases above indicate, several courts have had significant is-
sues with enforcing agreements to arbitrate that apportion even a portion
of the arbitral fees to employees vindicating their statutory rights. How-
ever, there are arguments to the contrary.
In 1999, the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit
heard a case in which fees were a significant issue.72 The case involved a
dispute between Arthur Williams and his former employer, Cigna Finan-
cial Advisors Inc. (hereinafter "Cigna"). 73 Williams' employment was
covered by an arbitration clause, and following his termination, the clause
was exercised to hear Williams' age discrimination claim. 74 Following ar-
bitration of the matter, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Cigna and assessed
Williams $3,150 in arbitration fees.75 The United States District Court for
Northern District of Texas enforced the award, and Williams appealed.
Williams argued that the award manifestly disregarded the law and the
imposition of arbitral fees violated public policy.7 6
The court's opinion is in two parts, the second being of most rele-
vance to the point of this paper. The first portion of the court's opinion
dismissed Williams manifest disregard of the law argument, noting that
the evidence solidly supported the arbitrator's decision.77 In the second
part of the opinion, the court addressed the fee issue. Williams, relying on
Gilmer, Cole and Shankle, argued that the $3,150 in arbitral fees assessed
to him violated public policy. 78 However, the court disagreed and wrote
69. Id. (citing Awbrey vs. Pennzoil Co., 961 F.2d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 1992).)
70. Shankle, 163 F.3d. at 1235.
71. Id.
72. Williams vs. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999).
73. Id. at 755.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 755-64.
76. Id.
77. Williams, 197 F.3d at 762. The Court was so impressed with the evidence; they didn't
even go into part two of the manifest disregard of the law analysis. Id.
78. Id. at 763. The Cole Court relied heavily on Gilner in reaching their decision. Id.
10
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"in our opinion . . Gilmer does not so clearly imply that no part of ar-
bitral forum fees may ever be assessed against federal anti-discrimination
claimants, although it plainly indicates that an arbitral cost allocation
scheme may not be used to prevent the effective vindication of federal
statutory claims." 79 Noting that the arbitration procedures Williams was
contracted to had recently changed, the court nonetheless did not dispute
the fees assessed Williams because he had not demonstrated that he was
unable to pay the fees or that the fees "prevented him from having a full
opportunity to vindicate his claims effectively or prevented the arbitration
proceedings from affording him an adequate substitute for a judicial fo-
rum." 80 Further, the court noted Williams' situation was factually distin-
guishable from those described in Shankle and Cole, in that Williams was
making a six-figure income at his new job while pursuing the case against
his former employer.8 Therefore, since there was "no evidence that the
prospect of incurring forum fees hampered or discouraged Williams in the
prosecution of his claim," the fee issued was dispersed with in a manner
unfavorable to Williams. 82
The United States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit dealt with
similar issues in a case challenging the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement. 83 The case involved Susan Rosenberg and her former em-
ployer, Merrill Lynch.1 Rosenberg's employment was covered by an arbi-
tration agreement, which was invoked after she was fired and brought suit
for age and gender discrimination.8 5 The district court denied the motion
to compel arbitration. Rosenberg opted out of a class action settlement,
and instead chose to challenge the arbitration agreement before the United
States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit.86
The issues on appeal were many. The court determined that Title VII
claims were properly subject to arbitration, although the agreement at is-
79. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.)
80. Williams, 197 F.3d at 764.
81. Id. at 764-65.
82. Id. at 765. The Court noted that the arbitration provider rule change mooted the issue
of whether future fees would violate the rights of future litigants.
83. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 4-7.
86. Id. at 7.
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sue did not meet the basic requirements to mandate arbitration.87 Further,
the court concluded that the ADEA claims were properly subject to arbi-
tration agreements." Finally, the court dealt with the fee issue when it ad-
dressed the legality of the arbitration system under which Ms. Rosen-
berg's claim was slated to be heard.89 The court's response to the
challenges to the imposition of fees under the system was threefold.90
First, the court noted that sometimes arbitrators "do undesirable things in
individual cases," but this does not invalidate the entire system.91 Sec-
ondly, it did not appear to the court that fees were normally assessed to
the employee-litigant. 92 Finally, if "unreasonable fees were imposed on a
particular employee," such an assessment would violate Gilmer and Title
VII. 93 In addressing the unreasonableness of fees, the Court opined "con-
trary to Rosenberg's arguments, arbitration is often far more affordable to
plaintiffs and defendants alike than is pursuing a claim in court." 94 Thus,
although Gilmer does not mandate the enforcement of all arbitration
agreements, the Court ruled that Rosenberg had not met her evidentiary
burden of establishing the invalidity of the arbitral system simply by argu-
ing against the imposition of fees as part of that system. 95
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered
the fray when they too decided a case with a fee component. 96 The case
involved Mary Koveleskie's sexual discrimination suit against her former
employer, SBC Capital Markets Incorporated. 9 After Koveleskie brought
suit, SBC brought a motion to compel arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration clause that governed the employer-employee relationship. 98 The
district court, though, refused to compel arbitration and instead allowed
discovery to proceed. 99 SBC appealed.
On appeal, the court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the
case, then proceeded to discuss the preference for arbitration agreements
87. Id. at 8-20.
88. Rosenberg, 170 F3d at 12-14.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 15.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 16.
93. Id. The Court specifically cites the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA) which amended
Title VII. (cite)
94. Rosenberg, 170 E3d at 16 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31).
95. See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 16.
96. Koveleskie vs. SBC Capital Mkt., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 362-63.
98. Id. at 362.
99. ld. at 363.
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under the FAA and the Supreme Court's precedence.'0° After concluding
that the case was properly subject to arbitration, the court discussed the
adequacy of the arbitration procedures - including the issue of fees.'0'
On the issues of fees, the court quoted extensively from the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Rosenberg, adopting
the three part argument rejecting an attack on fees, and even noting that
the Cole court adopted a system of arbitration similar to the one at bar. 02
Finally, the court noted that when exorbitant fees are present, arbitrators
often waive the fees due to hardship. 0 3 Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed the district court and remanded the case in order to compel arbi-
tration in the matter. Thus, the fee issue did not invalidate the agreement.
As the varying outcomes of the aforementioned court decisions indi-
cate, the question of arbitral fees needed to be addressed. Should courts
apply a bright line rule, i.e. the Cole case, or should courts apply a more
fact-based analysis, i.e. the Williams case? When the Supreme Court con-
sidered arbitral fees as part of the Green Tree case, it was hoped that we
would finally have an answer.
II. GREEN TREE FINANCIAL VS. RANDOLPH
The case involved Larketta Randolph's challenge of the arbitration
agreement contained in the purchase contract for her mobile home. 0 4
Randolph financed the purchase of her new home through Green Tree Fi-
nancial of Alabama, whom she later sued, alleging violations of the Truth
in Lending Act. 05 Randolph attempted to have her action certified as a
class action, but the district court denied class certification and instead
compelled arbitration through Green Tree's motion. 0 6 Concurrently, the
100. Id. at 363-66.
101. Id. at 365. The Court specifically disagreed with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 evidenced Congress' intent to pre-
clude the arbitration of Title VII claims. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 1998). A majority of the Circuits disagree with Duffield. Koveleskie, 167 Ed at
366.
102. Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 366 (citing Cole, 105 F.Ad 1465 and Williams, 197 F.3d 752).
103. Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 366.
104. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
105. Id. at 82-83.
106. Id. at 83.
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district court dismissed Randolph's complaint with prejudice. 10 7 Randolph
requested reconsideration, arguing that she lacked the resources to arbi-
trate. 108 The district court denied reconsideration and Randolph appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 09 The
court of appeals ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because
granting the motion to compel arbitration was a final appealable order
under the FAA. The court further ruled that the agreement to arbitrate was
invalid because it failed to provide minimum statutory guarantees, mainly
due to its silence as to who was responsible for the costs of arbitration."10
According to the court of appeals, the entire agreement to arbitrate was
unenforceable, because Randolph's ability to vindicate her statutory rights
was substantially hampered by high arbitration costs."' Green Tree ap-
pealed the court's decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
answer the final order and fee questions.
The second section of the opinion deals with the procedural question
of whether an order to compel arbitration is appealable as a final order
under the FAA."12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that it was a final appealable order, but a majority of appel-
late courts had reached contrary conclusions." 13 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court overruled the majority of the appellate courts and joined the Elev-
enth Circuit holding that an order compelling arbitration is a final appeal-
able order under the FAA." 14
The third part of the opinion is particularly applicable to this study,
for the Supreme Court dealt with the imposition of arbitral fees." 5 Ran-
dolph's arbitration agreement was silent as to the assignment and/or ap-
107. Id. The district court believed the arbitral forum was the proper forum to hear the
case.
108. Id. at 83-84.
109. Id. at 84.
110. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 84.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 84-89.
113. Id. at 87, n.3. The courts holding contrary to the Eleventh Circuit were Seacoast Mo-
tors of Salisbury, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 143 F.3d 626, 628-629 (1st Cir. 1998); Altman Nursing,
Inc. v. Clay Capital Corp., 84 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1996); Napleton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 138
F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1998); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 15 F.3d 93, 95 (8th
Cir. 1994); McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 122 F3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997). The courts
holding similarly to the Eleventh Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, were Arnold v. Ar-
nold Corp.-Printed Communications for Bus., 920 F.2d 1269, 1276 (6th Cir. 1990) and Armijo
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995).
114. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 85-89.
115. Id. at 89-92.
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portionment of fees and costs."t 6 Randolph argued that this silence inter-
fered with the effective vindication of her statutory rights because she
faced potentially substantial arbitration costs." 7 In analyzing the issue, the
Court began by noting that the FAA was passed to end judicial hostility
toward arbitration agreements and also that numerous federal statutory
claims have properly been sent to arbitration." 8 Citing Gilmer, the Court
recanted the oft-heard line regarding the effective vindication of statutory
rights in arbitration." 9
In determining the validity of Ms. Randolph's arbitration agreement,
the Court noted that she did not challenge it as inappropriate for arbitra-
tion, but rather argued that the "risk" that she might bear prohibitively
high arbitration costs if she pursued her claim in the arbitral forum would
force her to forgo the arbitral resolution of any of her claims. 20 Although
the Court noted that "it may well be that the existence of large arbitration
costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicat-
ing her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum," the record did not
indicate that Randolph would bear such costs or be unable to afford them
should they be assessed to her.'2' Thus, the "risk" that a litigant would be
"saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalida-
tion of an arbitration agreement."' 2  Accordingly, the Court reversed the
court of appeals' determination, and ruled that the party attacking an arbi-
tration agreement because of fees bears the burden of establishing that the
fees are prohibitively expensive. 123 Randolph did not meet this burden.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens,
Justice David Souter and Stephen Breyer, dissented. 24 Although the dis-
sent agreed with the procedural rule adopted by the majority concerning
final appealable orders, they disagreed with the majority's discussion of
116. Id. at 89.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 89-90.
119. Id.
120. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90.
121. See id. at 90-91.
122. Id. at 90.
123. Id. at 91-92.
124. Id. at 92. Justice Breyer only dissented in part, and did not join in Part III of the
dissent.
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the fee issue. 125 Justice Ginsburg wrote "the Court today deals with the
'who pays' question" and essentially required "a party, situated as Ran-
dolph is, either to submit to the arbitration without knowing who will pay
for the forum or demonstrate up front that the costs, if imposed on her,
will be prohibitive. As I see it, the case in its current posture is not ripe
for such a disposition."' 126 After discussing arbitration precedence and the
Cole decision, the dissent argued that the "Court has reached out prema-
turely to resolve the matter in the lender's [Green Tree] favor."'' 27 The
proper approach, the dissent argued, would be to remand the case to clar-
ify what type of arbitral fee system Green Tree employed and whether
this system violated the law.128 Further, the dissent pointed out that Ran-
dolph could return to the district court post-arbitration. Thus the major-
ity's decision did not resolve the issue presented, was uncertain, and
lacked judicial economy. 129 Therefore, the dissent disapproved of the ma-
jority's action in reaching out to inadequately resolve an underdeveloped
issue.
III. THE POST-GREEN TREE Era
In the post-Green Tree era, three United States Courts of Appeals
have had occasion to visit the fee issue. Presumably, because the Supreme
Court had ruled on the issue and set forth a test, the determinations
should be unanimous. However, as the decisions indicate, the Supreme
Court's Green Tree language is far from a rule that creates predictable
results.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was the
first appellate court to apply Green Tree, and did so in Bradford v.
Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc.130 Bradford involved John B. Brad-
ford's age discrimination suit against his former employer, Rockwell
Semiconductor Systems Incorporated.' Bradford's employer was acquired
by Rockwell, and as a condition of employment, Bradford was required to
sign an arbitration agreement which required all claims to be arbitrated. 32
125. Id. at 92-93.
126. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 93. As a former civil procedure professor, one must grant
Justice Ginsburg deference in the area of procedure.
127. Id. at 96.
128. Id. at 96.
129. See id. at 97.
130. Bradford vs. Rockwell Semiconductors Sys., Inc., 238 E3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
131. Id. at 551 (emphasis in original).
132. Id.
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The terms of the agreement mandated that the "parties shall share equally
the fees and costs of the arbitrator."133 Bradford presented his claims in
arbitration, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of Rockwell. 134 Subsequently,
Bradford filed suit in district court alleging the same claims. The district
court granted Rockwell's motion for summary judgment. Bradford ap-
pealed arguing that "fee splitting provisions necessarily render arbitration
agreements unenforceable as a matter of law because" they deter employ-
ees from pursuing their rights under the federal statutes. 35 On appeal, Mr.
Bradford sought a bright line rule invalidating arbitration agreements that
assign all or part of the fees to employees. 36
The court began its opinion by recanting the Supreme Court's arbi-
tration precedence language, and then noting the approach taken by the
Cole and Paladino courts, and the contrary approach taken by the Wil-
liams, Rosenberg, and Kovleskie courts. 137 Next, the court noted that the
Supreme Court said in Green Tree that fees could render an arbitration
agreement unenforceable where the costs are so prohibitively high that
they deny the litigant the ability to effectively vindicate his statutory
rights. 38 The court then delved extensively into the Cole and Shankle
opinions, rejecting these approaches and adopting the Williams case-by-
case approach.3 9 The court opined, "we believe that the appropriate in-
quiry [when addressing arbitral fees] is one that evaluates whether the ar-
bitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to
litigation . . . ." 140 This approach, which the court argues complies with
the Supreme Court's Green Tree approach, calls upon a reviewing court to
examine "the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the
expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and
whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of
claims." 4 Thus, even though an employee litigant may have to pay
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 552.
136. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 552.
137. Id. at 553-54. All of the aforementioned cases are discussed in depth in section II of
this study.
138. Id. at 554 (citing Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90).
139. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 554-56.
140. Id. at 556.
141. Id.
17
Clark: The State of Arbitral Fees After <em>Green Tree Financial</em>: U
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
thousands of dollars in arbitration fees and costs, the overall cost of the
legal action would still be cheaper than a long, drawn out court action
with substantially higher legal fees. 42 Therefore, the question is not who
pays, but how much is paid and whether the employee litigant can afford
to pay this amount. Such an approach almost certainly requires courts to
conduct a post-arbitration inquiry because the necessary facts will not be
known until the parties have completed their arbitration in the matter.
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
had occasion again to consider a fee issue, but this time in the post-Green
Tree era. 43 The case involved Damiana Perez, a security agent employed
by Globe Airport Security Services, Inc. at the Miami International Air-
port. 44 After Perez was terminated, she brought a discrimination suit and
the employer countered with a motion to compel arbitration in accordance
with the extensive pre-employment dispute resolution agreement. 45 The
agreement contained a fee-sharing provision that explicitly split the fees
equally between the employer and the employee. 46 Based on the fee-
sharing clause, the district court denied the motion to compel arbitration
and Globe's appeal followed. 14
On appeal, the court considered two issues. First, it determined that
the FAA was applicable to Ms. Perez notwithstanding her employment at
a hub of interstate commerce. 48 Secondly, and most important to this
study, the court addressed the fee-sharing clause in light of the Green
Tree decision. 49 The court began by noting that the district court decided
the case before Green Tree, and regardless, this case was different than
Green Tree because the agreement at issue here was not silent as to
costs.110 The court argued that it was not necessary to go into an inquiry
to determine whether arbitral fees and cost were so prohibitively expen-
sive, because the agreement was "illegal and unenforceable for other
compelling reasons."l'1 Primarily, the court determined that the agreement
was illegal and unenforceable because it mandated arbitral fee sharing,
142. Id.
143. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 E3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001).
144. Id. at 1281.
145. Id. at 1281-83.
146. Id. at 1283.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1284. Ms. Perez had argued that she was engaged in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce, and thus was exempt from the FAA under the Circuit City decision. See
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
149. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284.
150. Id. at 1284-85.
151. Id. at 1285.
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and this conflicted with Title VII's grant of discretion to award costs and
fees to the prevailing party.152 Thus, because the agreement took away the
discretion of the arbitrator to award fees and costs in a Title VII action to
the prevailing party, the entire arbitration agreement was illegal. 53
The employer countered the court's disapproval of the fees and costs
provision, arguing that the court should sever any offending provision so
as to give effect to the agreement to arbitrate. 54 However, the court re-
fused to sever the illegal clause because it believed if it did sever clauses
of this type, employers would create arbitration agreements with illegal
clauses, thus deterring employees from bringing suit or forcing them to
bring suits to reform the agreement.'55 Instead, the court decided to invali-
date the agreement, forcing employers to create more employee-friendly
clauses at the outset of the relationship, rather than making courts do so
in the mist of a dispute. 56 Thus, public policy warranted invalidating the
entire agreement in order to encourage the creation of better arbitration
agreements.
After the Perez decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered a similar issue in a challenge to an arbitration
agreement. 57 The case involved Marken Gannon's discrimination suit
against her former employer, Circuit City Stores, Inc. 58 Gannon's employ-
ment was governed by an arbitration agreement that mandated fee-sharing
and limited punitive damages available in arbitration. 59 The district court
refused to compel arbitration, without reaching the fee issue, on grounds
that the punitive damage limitation rendered the entire agreement unen-
forceable because such language was illegal and contrary to federal dis-
crimination statutes. 60 Circuit City appealed.
152. Id. at 1285-86 [citing 42. U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(k)].
153. Perez, 253 F3d at 1287.
154. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 178-184 (1981) (allowing sev-
erance in cases analogous to Perez).
155. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
156. Id.
157. Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677 (2001), reh'g and reh'g en banc
denied.
158. Id. at 679.
159. Id. at 679-84.
160. Id.
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The court of appeals, while recognizing the illegality of punitive
damage clause, nonetheless severed the offending clause and gave effect
to the entire agreement, essentially disagreeing with Perez's public policy
approach to severance.' 6' Thus, the claim was sent to arbitration but with-
out a limitation on the amount of punitive damages available. 162 While ad-
dressing the fee-sharing clause, the court noted that under Green Tree,
fee-sharing is allowed unless the party challenging it can demonstrate the
costs are prohibitively expensive, and that even if they succeed at show-
ing this, the fee-sharing clause should be severed and the agreement to ar-
bitrate should go forward. 163 Therefore, despite the existence of illegal
clauses in an arbitration agreement, courts should enforce agreements to
arbitrate and sever any illegal clauses thereby giving effect to the parties'
intent to arbitrate their dispute.
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that there are divergent views
on whether fee-sharing is permissible in agreements to arbitrate employ-
ment disputes. Due in part to the Supreme Court's inability to issue a
bright line rule and the various Circuits' disparate views on the topic, pro-
spective employee litigants and their counsel are left with uncertainty
when considering whether to challenge an arbitration agreement on the is-
sue of arbitral fees. This section will present the various issues faced by
those who undertake the challenge, along with the arguments and counter-
arguments that pertain to them.
The first decision that must be made is whether to challenge the
agreement pre-arbitration or post-arbitration. If a party decides to chal-
lenge the agreement pre-arbitration, they may run into a court eager to re-
duce its caseload through use of the justiciability doctrine. Thus, a court
may determine the issue is not ripe for review because further factual de-
velopment is required.' 64 Counsel for employers will most certainly want
to argue ripeness at this stage in the dispute. Further, employer's counsel
may also argue that if the court decides to entertain the fee issue early
161. Id.
162. Id. at 682-83.
163. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 683 n.9. The dissent in Gannon would have followed Perez. Id.
at 683-84.
164. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 93. (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). See also Abbot Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-53 (1967) (noting a case is not ripe for review if further factual de-
velopment is required). But see Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 59 (1993) (noting
a case is ripe where the plaintiff is faced with an immediate dilemma).
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and invalidates the agreement because of the imposition of fees, such in-
tervention contradicts the strong federal presumption and policy in favor
of arbitration agreements. 65 After all, under Section 4 of the FAA, courts
have the power to set aside arbitrations in which the employee was not
effectively able to vindicate their statutory rights. Thus the pre-arbitration
phase is an inappropriate time to challenge the imposition of arbitral fees
because so little is known at that time. 166 However, the counter argument
is that under the Perez approach, courts should invalidate certain clauses
pre-arbitration in order to deter employers from placing illegal or offen-
sive clauses in arbitration agreements.
If there is a challenge to a clause pre-arbitration, it is essential that
elements of the clause be fully presented and explained to the court. If the
clause names a provider organization, or amends the rules of the provider
organization, such evidence must be presented in a manner to show how
this does or does not effectively deter the vindication of the employee's
statutory rights. Even if the clause seems offensive to employees' rights,
counsel for the employer may want to present the Williams and Bradford
approach, and argue that the employee will save money in the long run
since the prosecution of an arbitration case is generally less expensive in
the aggregate than the prosecution of the same case in court.
If there is a post-arbitration challenge to the arbitration clause based
upon fees, the case is slightly different. First, presumably, there is a better
factual record to base financial arguments upon. The costs of the arbitral
proceedings are known, and the employee's ability to pay this amount is
easier to establish. The employer's counsel may want to counter the em-
ployee's challenge with Gilmer's effective vindication of statutory rights
analysis, arguing that the fee clause had no effect on the employee's abil-
ity to present their claim in the arbitral forum. If such arguments are un-
persuasive, the employer's counsel should rely on Green Tree's "prohibi-
tively high" language, arguing that the employee must demonstrate that
the costs of arbitration were so prohibitively high that they interfered with
the vindication of the employee's rights. Again, to drive this point home,
the employer's counsel would want to present evidence of money saved
by sending the matter to arbitration as opposed to sending the matter to
165. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
166. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (West 2002).
21
Clark: The State of Arbitral Fees After <em>Green Tree Financial</em>: U
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
court. 167 However, the employer's counsel must keep in mind that post-
arbitration, if thousands of dollars in arbitral fees are assessed to an em-
ployee litigant, courts may be leery about allowing such an award to
stand.
The subject at hand is ripe with public policy issues on both sides,
and as such there is no apparent right or wrong approach when consider-
ing the imposition of fees arising from the arbitral forum. Employees will
continue to argue that fees effectively deter them from accessing the fo-
rum, while employers will counter this argument by noting that the possi-
bility of fees weeds out weak claims and frivolous suits by over-eager
plaintiff's attorneys. As the cost of arbitration rises, employees will chal-
lenge fees starting at $250 per hour, while employers will point out that
the money expended to pay the arbitrator is saved from money expended
to pay the attorney. Employees will seek a bright line rule, invalidating all
arbitration agreements that apportion any arbitral fees to prospective em-
ployee litigates. Employers will argue that a bright line goes too far and
leads to absurd results. For example, if Microsoft fires its Chief of Devel-
opment, Bill Gates, and the dispute goes to arbitration, is it per se unfair
to assess Bill Gates a couple thousand dollars in arbitral costs? Finally,
there are arguments in favor of invalidating an entire arbitration agree-
ment because of fees, as well as arguments in favor of severing offending
clauses and giving effect to the parties' intent to arbitrate the dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, these issues and many more will continue to arise, and
opinions will continue to diverge depending on which judicial district or
circuit the parties are located. Such ambiguity and uncertainty is almost
certain to continue until the Supreme Court revisits their decision in
Green Tree and clarifies the approach that all courts construing fee issues
in arbitration agreements must take. In fashioning such a rule, the Court
must be mindful of the consequences of apportioning fees to minimum
wage workers who signed agreements to arbitrate their employment re-
lated disputes as a condition of their employment, and employers who
utilize arbitration to keep down the costs of litigating disputes that invari-
ably come with employees. As such, it must strike a proper balance be-
167. A publication by the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution notes
that most attorneys will not begin a lawsuit worth less than $60,000.00, while arbitration costs
can amount to five percent of this total. See Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitra-
tion and Civil Rights, in ARBITRATION Now 25 (Paul H. Haagan and ABA Section on Dispute
Resolution eds, 1999).
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tween these two interests, establish a workable rule, and provide adequate
guidance and clarification. Until then, the current state of the rules regard-
ing fees will continue to harm the arbitral process favored by the Court.
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